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VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS IN MONTANA: NEW
LEGISLATION SERVES THE TERMINALLY ILL
Bernard A. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana has joined a growing number of states that have
enacted viatical settlement laws and/or regulations.1 In Latin,
"viaticum" generally means "provision for the journey,"2 a con-
cept uniquely appropriate to this form of settlement. In a viatical
settlement,3 an investor pays a terminally ill holder of a life
insurance policy a lump sum in consideration for being named
the policyholder or beneficiary who will be paid the policy's death
benefit upon the seller's death.4 By selling his or her policy at a
discount from face value,5 a policyholder may obtain a lump sum
settlement at a time when, most often, few other financial re-
sources are available.6
This paper examines viatical settlements, in Montana and
generally, from several perspectives. Part II provides a brief
history and description of viatical settlements. Part III considers
* Practicing attorney in Idaho Falls, Idaho, BA. University of Montana, 1988,
M.P.A. University of Montana, 1990, J.D. University of Montana School of Law,
1997. The author wishes to thank State Auditor Mark OKeefe for allowing him to
assist in drafting Montana's viatical settlement legislation, and Professor David
Aronofsky for his advice and counsel throughout that project.
1. The Montana Viatical Settlement Act was passed by the 1997 legislative
session and was signed by Governor Marc Racicot on April 17, 1997, becoming ef-
fective on October 1, 1997. At the time of passage, twenty states had enacted viatical
settlement laws.
2. OXFORD LATiN DICTIoNARY 2054 (P. G. W. Glare ed. 1982).
3. Although viatical settlements and accelerated benefits are often lumped
together as "living benefits," the two are similar only in what they seek to accom-
plish. Accelerated benefits are offered to policyholders by (some) insurers as riders to
many existing life policies. In contrast to viatical settlements, there is no discount
from the policy's face value but, instead, often only an administrative fee is charged
for processing the accelerated benefit claim. An additional premium for the rider is
also charged while the rider is in effect. While other differences also exist, for pur-
poses of this paper it is only important to be aware that the two forms of "living
benefits" are vastly different in the way they provide funds to terminally ill people.
4. See June R. Herold, Death Benefits the Living: Industry Grows on Terminal-
ly Ill's Insurance,HOUST. CHRON., June 7, 1992, at 9 (noting that although about
ninety-five percent of the people who viaticate their life insurance policies are af-
flicted with AIDS, people with cancer and other terminal illnesses also sell their life
insurance policies).
5. See Carole C. Lamson, Legal Introduction in Living Benefits in Life Insur-
ance: New Perspectives and Developments, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 16 (Nov. 1993).
6. See Herold, supra note 4 (reporting, for example, that one company, Living
Benefits, Inc. of New Mexico, purchased 225 policies in 1991 worth $25.7 million,
with the average value of those policies being $80,000.00).
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the necessity for regulation of persons and entities offering these
settlements. Part IV discusses the pros and cons of viatical set-
tlements and Part V provides an overview of Montana's Viatical
Settlement Act (VSA), codified as Montana Code Annotated Title
33, Chapter 20. Part VI concludes the paper by discussing the
legislation in terms of public interest.
II. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS
A viatical settlement first appeared in 1988' as a means for
the terminally ill, most often those afflicted with AIDS, to obtain
desperately needed funds.8 As the AIDS epidemic spread,9 a
viatical settlement industry began to develop, expanding from
one company in 1988 to at least forty such companies operating
nationally today.i At present, no viatical settlement companies
are known to be based in Montana.1
A viatical settlement occurs when a terminally ill person
(the viator) irrevocably names as the beneficiary, on his or her
life insurance policy, an investor willing to pay the viator a lump
sum of money for that designation. The exact amount of the
payment is calculated by discounting an agreed upon percentage
from the face value of the policy, with the difference being paid
to the viator. Typically, the amount paid is fifty to eighty percent
of the face value of the policy, which results in the purchas-
er/beneficiary commonly realizing a twenty to forty percent profit
7. See Jennifer Berner, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing Him? Ex-
amining the Harmful Effects of Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 581, 583 (1994).
8. See Russell J. Herron, Regulating Viatical Settlements: Is the Invisible Hand
Picking the Pockets of the Terminally Ill?, 28 U. MICH. L.J. REF. 931, 932 (1995)
(reporting that a 1992 survey revealed that over fifty percent of the respon-
dents-people afflicted with AIDS-had difficulty paying for. medicine, clothing,
transportation, housing, and food. Almost thirty percent reported living on less than
$500.00 per month, while another thirty percent reported living on between $500.00
and $1,000.00 per month).
9. For example, the 242,146 cases of AIDS reported nationally at the end of
1992 has expanded to 554,093 as of August 31, 1995. In Montana those afflicted
with AIDS has grown from one reported case in 1983 to 318 reported cases as of
September 20, 1996-of which 197 are now deceased. Interview with Jim Murphy,
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (Sept. 20, 1996).
10. See Lamson, supra note 5, at 22.
11. Interview with various officials in the Montana Insurance Commissioner's
Office (Sept. 20, 1996). Because Montana did not license or otherwise regulate
viatical settlement providers or brokers before passage of VSA, no estimates are
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upon payment of the death benefit. 2 The shorter the viator's
life expectancy when the settlement is executed, the more the
purchaser is willing to pay to be named as the viator's beneficia-
ry or policy holder.
In addition to individuals and companies that purchase
beneficial rights to viators' life insurance policies, viatical settle-
ment brokers have also carved out a niche in the viatical settle-
ment market. These brokers act as intermediaries between
viators and potential purchasers, and work principally toward
identifying and contacting potential viators on behalf of purchas-
er clients. Once a viatical settlement is executed as a result of
the broker's efforts, a fee is paid to the broker that is commonly
a percentage of the negotiated settlement amount.
As the viatical settlement market has emerged and expand-
ed, so also have the possibilities for abuse, mainly in the form of
misrepresentation, misuse of confidential information, or the
exercise of undue influence over vulnerable and often desperate
terminally ill people.'3 The next section of this paper considers
the potential for such abuses and regulatory efforts to prevent
and/or address them.
III. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
The need for viatical settlement regulation is most apparent
when one considers the abuses that may attend this emerging
enterprise. At the core of these potential abuses lies the ability of
viatical settlement companies and brokers (VSCBs) to control
information critical to those contemplating a viatical settlement.
For example, only VSCBs can provide information about the
solvency of the prospective purchasers of a viator's policies. By
misinforming a viator (either by omission or commission), VSCBs
may induce a viator to settle with a purchaser that, in the end,
will not be able to perform as promised. Marginally solvent or
insolvent VSCBs may also compound the harmful effect of this
misinformation by luring viators away from opportunities to set-
tle with solvent VSCBs. Even for a healthy person, the litigation
arising from such misrepresentation would be both trying and
12. See Lamson, supra note 5, at 16.
13. See Charles E. Schmidt, Jr., Viatical Firms Fighting Outlaw Image, Best's
Review-Life-Health Insurance Edition, March, 1996, at 69-70 (reporting that one of
the primary reasons the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted a
model law relating to viatical settlements was to protect consumers from falling prey
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lengthy. For a terminally ill person, it would not only underscore
an immeasurable personal tragedy, but would also probably not
be feasible-either financially or practically.
Beyond solvency considerations, other information critical to
those contemplating viatical settlements is commonly within the
expertise of VSCBs. For example, VSCBs are by their nature
situated to know the potential impact viatical settlements may
have on a viator's tax planning,14 or on the viator's need-based
public assistance, 5 or the fact that settlement monies may be
subject to claims of creditors. Arguably, if VSCBs do not advise a
potential viator of these considerations they may be acting in
bad faith. More certainly, they would be acting in their own self-
interest to the marked disadvantage of a person who is short on
time and money. If VSCBs do not provide such information to a
potential viator, it is highly unlikely the viator will otherwise
become aware of it.
Yet another significant area of information controllable by
VSCBs relates to the medical information provided to them by a
viator or by the medical practitioners who have treated the
viator. Misuse of this information could leave a viator unable to
obtain credit, or possibly affect the viator's potential or existing
employment. As in the previously described scenarios, a termi-
nally ill person whose confidentiality rights have been violated
will find the availability of statutory or civil remedies of little
use or comfort. Realistically, legal remedies will not be available
to a potential viator nor will the person be able to overcome the
harmful effects of unauthorized disclosures in other ways. A
terminally ill person simply do not have time to pursue remedies
for or outlive this kind of personal damage. For those who might
intentionally or inadvertently breach or abuse their possession of
such confidential information, there is little at risk in terms of
adverse response by those affected.
The potential for such abuses, coupled with the unlikely
proposition that those who might be injured by them will live
long enough to recover any damages or receive the benefit of
14. Although the federal enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 331(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2067-69
(1996), provides that proceeds from viatical settlements after December 31, 1996, are
now tax free, the need for tax planning to consider other factors associated with the
use of such proceeds remains advisable. See I.R.C. § 101(g) (1997).
15. See William Doyle, Life Insurance Buyouts Can Gouge the Terminally Ill,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at 3 (reporting that large lump sum payments from
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their bargains, suggests that VSCBs must be policed by means
other than the threat of being sued. Simply stated, government
oversight of VSCBs may be the only way to ensure that a poten-
tial viator does not become victims of abuses such as the ones
described above. Moreover, the presence of such regulatory over-
sight may actually eliminate some level of anxiety that the ter-
minally ill person might otherwise experience as he or she con-
templates viatical settlements. With governmental oversight in
place, a viator at least will know that the VSCBs with whom the
person might negotiate a settlement have met statutory stan-
dards to do business in Montana.
IV. PROS AND CONS OF VIATICAL SETTLEMENT REGULATION
While many arguments exist either favoring or disfavoring
viatical settlement regulation, it is beyond the scope of this pa-
per to explore all of them. Instead, this section of the paper pres-
ents a synopsis of the prevailing points of view.
A. Arguments for Regulation
In addition to the reasons set forth in Part III of this paper,
those favoring regulation of viatical settlements also offer an
"industry protection" argument." They contend the best inter-
ests of the industry are served because regulation prevents infor-
mational inequalities, thereby protecting against "market fail-
ure."" This position is based on the notion that "markets need
adequate information on prices, quality and terms if they are to
function efficiently."18 Those who subscribe to this position be-
lieve that generalized requirements to provide information are
less restrictive than requiring specific terms of disclosure, and
they also allow the industry to remain flexible in terms of re-
sponding to customer preferences and changing information-
based technologies, such as the expanding use of the Internet.
Put another way, if VSCBs are driven to provide information to
consumers by a desire to remain competitive rather than by (or
at least in addition to) regulations setting out in rigid terms
everything that must be disclosed, they will not be impeded by
16. See Lamson, supra note 5, at 17; Lee Ann Dean, Note, Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the Health Care Crisis: AIDS Patients
Reach Into the Future to Make Ends Meet, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 144 (Autumn 1993).
17. Herron, supra note 8, at 938.
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those regulations when consumer demands and technologies
change. Thus, while this argument does not support imposition
of regulations to provide "perfect information" 9 to consumers, it
does support the proposition that "adequate information"20 must
be provided to consumers if the market is to remain viable.2"
B. Arguments Against Regulation
The main opposition to viatical settlement legislation centers
on a "free alienation of property" argument. Advocates of this
position assert, first, that the commonly held preference for free
alienation of property in this country rests upon the following
three principles: "(1) unlimited alienability of property ensures
that property will go to those individuals who value it most; (2)
free alienability helps to control the market system by increasing
the production of goods that buyers want and decreasing produc-
tion of unwanted goods; and (3) free alienability increases an
individual's ability to make choices concerning the quality of an
individual's life."22 With these principles in mind, opponents of
viatical settlement legislation also note that courts balance the
preference toward free alienability against the interest in pro-
tecting the rights of the general public.' Accordingly, courts
limit alienability when: (1) a transaction "creates economic ineffi-
ciencies in the form of externalities, or costs to third parties;"24
(2) "private contracting creates undesirable external consequenc-
es," such as the creation of publicly harmful monopolies, or when
such contracts alienate human capital;' and (3) contracts to
alienate property are the product of "harmful momentary temp-
19. Proponents make the distinction between "perfect information" and "ade-
quate information" by pointing out that "perfect information" would be too costly to
provide and, even if it were provided, would be so complex that viators would have
great difficulty understanding it. "Perfect information" would include such things as
actuarial justifications or consideration of other variables that influence development
of settlement offers.
20. As opposed to "perfect information," "adequate information" is comprised of
data such as that which is commonly required by viatical settlement statutes-like
tax implications, subjectivity to creditor's claims, etc.
21. See Herron, supra note 8, at 939.
22. Berner, supra note 7, at 593-94, (primarily citing Stewart E. Sterk, Re-
straints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 384-86 (1993); Richard
A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); and Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Alienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972)).
23. See Berner, supra note 7, at 594-95.
24. Id. at 595.
25. See Id. at 596.
[Vol. 59
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tations," such as those contracts completed by intoxicated indi-
viduals.2"
In light of the above, opponents of viatical settlement legisla-
tion find fault with legislation that imposes either minimum
discount rates for settlement agreements or licensing require-
ments for individual purchasers.27 Each is discussed below.
1. Discount Rates for Settlement Agreements
On this point, opponents argue that regulating minimum
discount rates violates the principle of free alienation in the
three ways. First, mandatory minimum rates prevent goods (the
purchaser's capital investment) from going to those who value
them the most because the mandated minimum rates will, in
effect, become the maximum that purchasers will likely offer.
Second, minimum rates prevent free alienation from controlling
the price system because, as a form of price controls, they inter-
fere with the basic law of supply and demand. Finally, opponents
argue that the imposition of minimum discount rates prevents
both viators and purchasers from making choices about the qual-
ity of their lives. For example, they argue that the inability of
purchasers to go below a certain rate will effectively encourage
them to purchase only policies that will offer the quickest return,
that is, policies from those viators that have the shortest life
expectancies. When such choices are made, those potential
viators with longer life expectancies-who may wish to obtain a
viatical settlement to fund activities that would be otherwise
impossible-will be excluded from the market because purchas-
ers will not be able to justify offering a discount rate that is
commensurate with their life expectancies.
2. Licensing Requirements for Individual Purchasers
Opponents argue that by requiring individuals to become li-
censed in the same manner as viatical settlement companies
before they enter into settlement agreements, many potential
purchasers are deterred from entering the market. As a result,
they continue, competitive pricing in the market is reduced and
26. See Id. at 596-97.
27. While Montana's VSA does not impose minimum discount rates, it does
allow the Commissioner to promulgate rules which quite probably would address this
potentially troublesome area of viatical settlements. The legislation does require indi-
vidual providers of viatical settlements to become licensed if they are involved as a
third party in more than one viatical settlement in a calendar year.
1998]
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many if not all viators will be unable to realize a maximum rate
of return on the sale of the beneficiary rights on their policies.
Additionally, this type of legislation reduces aviator's choice for
a purchaser of those policy rights. For example, a viator may
prefer to deal with an individual whom the viator knows to be
trustworthy and reputable rather than with a large company or
a stranger. Such choices may be impossible, however, if that
person is unwilling to submit to licensing procedures, or is un-
qualified for a license despite being willing and able to perform
as a purchaser in a viatical settlement. Thus, opponents of regu-
lation argue that the net effect of this situation is that licensing
requirements prevent free alienation by limiting the quality of
life choices that a viator can make.
V. MONTANA'S NEW REGULATORY SCHEME
Montana's "Viatical Settlement Act " ' is comprehensive in
its approach to protecting consumers from abuse. First, it pro-
vides for licensure of VSCBs that wish to do business in Mon-
tana.2" Second, it sets forth numerous items that must be dis-
closed to viators.3 ° Third, it establishes confidentiality stan-
dards for VSCBs operating in this state."' The following subsec-
tions describe these provisions, and others, in more detail.
A- Licensure of VSCBs
The VSA requires licensure of both viatical settlement pro-
viders and brokers by the Insurance Commissioner. 2 It stipu-
lates that the Commissioner must be confident of a license
28. At the request of Honorable Mark O'Keefe, Montana's State Auditor and In-
surance Commissioner, the author of this paper researched and drafted the viatical
settlement legislation which Mr. OKeefe submitted to the 1997 Montana legislative
session.
29. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1303(1) (1997).
30. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311 (1997).
31. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1313(3) (1997).
32. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1303 (1997). As the viatical settlement mar-
ket emerged, a controversy also developed concerning whether these settlements qual-
ified as investment contracts that would be subject to federal securities laws. As a
result of litigation which started in August, 1995, concerning this issue, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled not only that viatical settlements
are not exempt from laws as insurance contracts, but also that they are not securi-
ties subject to federal securities laws either-pursuant to the three tiered Howey test.
See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1996). Given this ruling-which confirmed the predominant state-level thinking on the
subject-regulatory control of viatical settlements has fallen within the purview of
state insurance commissioners almost by default.
[Vol. 59
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applicant's financial responsibility and good business reputation
before a license is issued." To satisfy this standard, the Com-
missioner may request applicants to provide a wide range of
background information, along with a statement of either a busi-
ness plan or plan of operation.3' This information may be veri-
fied by the Commissioner before any license is issued.35 The
VSA also enables the Commissioner to verify and/or monitor the
financial fitness of licensees by requiring them to file annual
reports with the Commissioner,36 and also by allowing the Com-
missioner to examine the business and practices of any licensee
or applicant whenever the Commissioner determines such exami-
nations are necessary.37
The VSA also requires a VSCB applicant to file with its
application for licensure a copy of the viatical settlement agree-
ment the applicant intends to use if the license is issued.'
These contract forms must be pre-approved by the Commissioner
before being used, even if the VSCB applicant receives a li-
cense." Additionally, the legislation requires that licensees im-
mediately notify the Commissioner of any material changes in
ownership or control of the licensed company that affects its
qualification for the license.4 ° It also requires that nonresident
applicants appoint the Commissioner as their attorney for pur-
poses of receiving any service of process upon the licensee.41
The VSA sets forth numerous grounds which permit the Com-
missioner to suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to permit
or renew any license applied for or granted relating to viatical
settlements.42
Montana's VSA exempts many persons and entities from
33. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1304(lXc) (1997).
34. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1303(3) (1997).
35. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1304(1) (1997).
36. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1309 (1997).
37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1310(1) (1997).
38. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1303(3) (1997).
39. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1304(1) (1997).
40. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1306 (1997).
41. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1304(2) (1997).
42. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1307(1)-(3) (1997). Included among the
grounds for such action by the Commissioner are: falsifications on applications for
licenses; conduct resulting in felony convictions; refusal of licensees to allow examina-
tion of their accounts and records by the commissioner; and, dishonesty or fraud in
the conduct of business as a licensee. Notably, the VSA allows the Commissioner to
suspend or refuse to renew a license without a hearing if the Commissioner deter-
mines the licensee is insolvent or in such poor financial condition as to pose an
imminent threat to the public health, safety, or welfare of the residents of this state.
1998]
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licensure requirements.' For example, banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions and other licensed lending institutions
that take assignments of life insurance policies as loan collateral
only are not required to be licensed under VSA's legislation."
Similarly, insurance companies offering accelerated benefits are
not required to be licensed as viatical settlement providers,45
nor are individuals who enter into only one viatical settlement
per calendar year as a third party purchaser.' Corporations,
partnerships and partners may also purchase life insurance
contracts of employees, retirees of a corporation, or of partners
without having to be licensed under this act, so long as other
provisions of the act are honored.47
B. Disclosure Requirements
The VSA requires disclosure by viatical settlement providers
of several important points prior to the date on which the
viatical settlement contract is signed by all parties.48 First, al-
ternatives to viatical settlements-such as accelerated bene-
fits-must be presented to viators." Second, the possible tax
implications must be discussed and the viator must be told of the
advisability of seeking assistance from a personal tax advisor."
Third, neither viatical settlement providers and brokers, nor
their employees and/or agents, may act as personal tax advisors
in this regard."1 Fourth, viators must also be advised that set-
tlement proceeds may be subject to claims of creditors, 2 and
that viators' public entitlements, if any, also may be adversely
affected by the settlement.53 Fifth, the right of a viator to re-
scind the settlement contract not later than thirty days after
execution of the contract or no later than fifteen days after the
viator receives the settlement proceeds must also be disclosed.54
Finally, the viator must be advised of the date by which the
43. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1302(3Xc) (1997).
44. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1302(3XcXi) (1997).
45. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1302(3XcXii) (1997).
46. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1302(3XcXiii) (1997).
47. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1302(3XcXiv) (1997).
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311 (1997).
49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (1997).
50. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311(2) (1997).
51. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311(2) (1997).
52. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311(3) (1997).
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311(4) (1997).
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viator will receive settlement proceeds and, most importantly,
that the settlement contract will become void if the provider fails




Confidentiality standards relating to viatical settlements are
established by direct reference to those set forth in sections 33-
19-101 through 33-19-409 of the Montana Code.56 Chapter 19 of
Montana's Insurance Code is entitled "Insurance Information
and Privacy Protection" and, although all four parts of the chap-
ter pertain to the confidentiality concerns relating to viatical
settlements, parts three and four are most germane to this pa-
per. To facilitate the incorporation by reference to chapter 19,
the VSA specifies that viatical settlement licensees are to be con-
sidered "insurance support organizations" (ISOs) as defined in
the Montana Insurance Code. 7
With the foregoing in mind, part three of chapter 19 autho-
rizes release of personal information to VSCBs/ISOs upon "prop-
er identification" of an individual or entity who submits a writ-
ten request for that information." Similarly, VCSBs and ISOs
may release medical information upon request to either the indi-
vidual or to a medical professional designated by the individu-
al.59 Immediately upon doing so, however, the VCSBs and ISOs
must also advise the individual that they have released informa-
tion and to whom." Finally, eighteen separate limitations and
conditions are listed which pertain to disclosure of information
about insured individuals.
61
Part four of chapter 19 provides for enforcement by the Com-
missioner of the first three parts of chapter 19. Briefly, it gives
the Commissioner the power "to examine and investigate" as the
Commissioner deems necessary to determine if violations of
55. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1311(6)-(7) (1997).
56. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1313(3) (1997). In conjunction with passage
of the VSA, various other sections of the Montana Code Annotated, including Chapter
19, were modified consistent with references thereto made in the VSA.
57. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-104(12) (1997); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §
33-20-1313(3) (1997).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-301(1) (1997); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§
33-19-104(10), 33-20-1313(3) (1997).
59. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-301(3) (1997).
60. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-301(3) (1997).
61. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-306(1)-(18) (1997).
1998]
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chapter 19 have occurred. 2 Part four also provides for the Com-
missioner to hold hearings pertaining to alleged violations of this
chapter, and for the Commissioner to reduce any findings and
conclusions arising from those hearings to writing.' Service
upon respondents by the commissioner of those findings and
conclusions is also required by this part." Civil penalties, judi-
cial review of orders and reports, remedial options, and immuni-
ty from suit for providing information in accordance with this
chapter are also addressed in part four.'
Perhaps most notable among the part four provisions, how-
ever, is section 33-19-407 of the Montana Code. This section,
entitled "Individual Remedies," provides the additional right to
seek equitable relief or damages-depending on the violation-in
the district court to any person whose rights are violated, as
enumerated in part three." In addition to establishing a two-
year statute of limitations for bringing such actions, 7 recovery
of the cost of the action and reasonable attorney's fees may be
allowed to the prevailing party.'
D. Additional Noteworthy Provisions
The VSA gives the Commissioner rule-making authority to
determine and set allowable fees, commissions, or other valuable
consideration that may be charged or received for services ren-
dered by viatical settlement brokers or providers.69 Also includ-
ed in this authority is provision for regulation of discount rates
used to determine the amount to be paid to viators in exchange
for assignment of the beneficial rights to their life insurance poli-
cies.70 In establishing these rates, however, the VSA requires
the Commissioner to consider payments made in regional and
national viatical settlement markets as well as model standards
developed by the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers.
71
62. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-401(1) (1997).
63. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-402, -404 (1997). Hearings conducted under
this section are governed by MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101 to -711 (1997) and §§ 33-
1-701 to -708 (1997).
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-403 (1997).
65. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-405 to -408 (1997).
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-407(1) (1997).
67. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-407(4) (1997).
68. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-407(3) (1997).
69. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1315 (1997).
70. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1315(1) (1997).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1315(1) (1997).
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The VSA also sets forth conditions precedent to the execu-
tion of viatical settlements.72 Principal among them is a re-
quirement that the provider obtain a written statement from the
attending physician that the viator is of sound mind and under
no constraint or undue influence." Similarly, a witnessed docu-
ment must be obtained in which the viator consents to the settle-
ment contract, acknowledges the terminal nature of the condition
or illness, and represents that the viator has a full and complete
understanding of the proposed settlement agreement and of the
benefits of the .life insurance policy which provides the basis of
the settlement agreement.74 This document also approves re-
lease of the viator's medical records that relate to the terminal
illness or condition," and acknowledges that the viatical settle-
ment contract is being entered into freely and voluntarily.7" Fi-
nally, a determination must be made by an attending physician
that the illness or condition is, in fact, terminal.77
The legislation also addresses the method and timeliness of
payment to viators upon execution of settlement agreements. In
short, providers must pay a lump sum to an approved escrow
agent immediately upon receipt of documents from the viator
which effect the transfer of the underlying insurance docu-
ments.7" Those proceeds are paid to the viator upon receipt by
the escrow agent of documents from the insurer that acknowl-
edge the changes agreed upon in the viatical settlement.79 The
requirement of a lump sum payment is effective only if another
form of payment, such as installment payments or purchase of
an approved annuity, has not been set out as part of the settle-
ment agreement."O
VI. CONCLUSION
Montana's viatical settlement law serves the public's inter-
est. It balances regulatory constraints placed on the industry
against the desires of terminally ill people in Montana to partici-
pate in these agreements. On the one hand, the legislation pro-
72. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312 (1997).
73. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312(lXa) (1997).
74. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312(1XbXi)-(iv) (1997).
75. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312(lXbXv) (1997).
76. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312(lXbXvi) (1997).
77. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1312(2XaXb), (3) (1997).
78. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1314(1) (1997).
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1314(1) (1997).
80. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1314(2) (1997).
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vides assurance to those people, through the licensure require-
ments, that companies and brokers who operate in Montana are
solvent and otherwise able to perform if their settlement offers
are accepted. Moreover, by excepting from the licensing require-
ments a variety of persons and entities, this legislation ensures
that, by its own terms, it is as minimally restrictive as possible
in this regard.
Beyond the licensure requirements, the VSA's provisions
against unlawful disclosure of confidential information also pro-
tect the public, but in a manner already proven workable and
acceptable by another section of the Montana Insurance Code.
Similarly, by mandating that certain very salient information be
disclosed to viators by those offering viatical settlements, the
Montana legislation ensures that citizens contemplating viatical
settlements are well informed. This goal is accomplished at very
little expense or inconvenience to the industry. The VSA provi-
sions specifying the methods and conditions regarding payment
of the settlement funds to viators are significant and serve the
public's interest.
The absence of minimum rate requirements in the legisla-
tion militates against the free alienation argument put forward
by opponents of viatical settlement legislation. Nonetheless,
while the Commissioner has the ability to promulgate rules on
this point, the administrative procedures for doing so will allow
interested members of the public to participate fully in that
process.
To summarize, no law promulgated in Montana or anywhere
else will ever be completely acceptable to every segment of soci-
ety or to every individual that such laws affect. Attempts to
achieve a balance in formulating those laws that acknowledge
this reality better serve the public's interest. Judged by this
standard, especially in terms of the relatively small segment of
Montana's population likely to be directly affected by this legis-
lation, Montana's new viatical settlement law goes a long way
toward serving the public's interest.81
81. While such considerations are far beyond the scope of this paper, it is im-
portant to note that the general population is also served by this legislation because,
as viators are able to successfully access this form of living benefit, the demand for
public assistance and other entitlements is accordingly decreased.
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